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ABSTRACT
This position paper describes how blockchains facilitate the imple-
mentation of distributed self-adaptive systems. We demonstrate
how the master/slave decentralised control pattern for self-adaptive
systems, integrated with a permissioned blockchain, can protect
nodes of a network against attacks by continuously adapting the
membership of an access control list.Whenevermalicious behaviour
is detected, consensus on an updated access control list is reached,
and that node is removed from the network. Using a smart home, as
an example, we demonstrate that a permissioned blockchain is able
to maintain a consistent view of a network of Internet of Things
(IoT) devices in the presence of malicious nodes.
CCS CONCEPTS
· Software and its engineering→ Software design engineer-
ing; · Security and privacy→ Access control;
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we investigate how the master/slave pattern, identi-
ied as one of the patterns for decentralised control in self-adaptive
system [5] can be implemented within a framework of a blockchain.
This will be presented in the context of a private network of inter-
connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The proof-of-concept
implementation uses an open source permissioned blockchain (℧ul-
tiChain 1) for maintaining an immutable record of transactions in
order to handle malicious behaviour.
Blockchains provide one common virtual trusted ledger, which is
replicated, produced collaboratively, and validated in a distributed
fashion. Validated information is incorporated into the blockchain,
after a consensus protocol ensures that the nodes agree on a unique
order of the transactions. Taking as a reference the master/slave
pattern, a blockchain is able to fulil the activities of the ℧onitor
1https://www.multichain.com/
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and Execute stages of the ℧APE-K loop that should be deployed on
the nodes of private network, while the activities of the Analysis
and Plan stages should be performed by a centralised node. The
Knowledge (℧odel) can either be kept by each node as an access
control list (ACL), or inferred by analysing the transactions of a
block.
There have been a couple of publications regarding IoT secu-
rity and blockchains [2±4]. For example, it has been argued that
blockchains can solve a great number of IoT's security and pri-
vacy issues, and a subsequent architecture has been proposed for
supporting a blockchain-based smart home [2]. While in [4], the
authors introduce a novel access control mechanism using Bitcoin's
scripting abilities. However, the challenge of protecting a system
against behavioural uncertainties of malicious nodes was not cov-
ered. The goal of this paper is to apply the lessons learned from
Self-adaptive Authorisation Framework (SAAF) [1] into blockchains
in order to protect a private network against malicious behaviours.
This exercise has shown that security should be considered in the
context of other quality attributes, in our case dependability, which
is fundamental for achieving consensus.
2 BACKGROUND ON BLOCKCHAINS
Blockchains provide a veriiable history of transactions between
nodes in a network, and require the signing of messages via public-
key cryptographic techniques. By maintaining an immutable record
of previous transactions and using their hashes as a required input
for succeeding transactions, the system maintains a permanent and
accountable ledger of transactions that are explicitly linked. In this
way, no previous transaction can be altered by any party, as doing
so would cause cryptographic hashes to change. In a blockchain,
transactions traditionally enter a mempool (in-memory store) after
submission, and await to be mined. ℧ining is the process whereby
valid transactions are collected into a block, and committed to the
chain. Upon mining, the latest block is considered to be the most
up-to-date accepted version of transactions.
As multiple nodes can submit diferent and valid blocks at the
same time, a consensus protocol is needed to decide between com-
peting blocks. Numerous consensus protocols exist, such as, proof-
of-work, proof-of-stake (PoS) and ℧ining Diversity.
Permissionless (or public) blockchains, such as Bitcoin 2 and
Ethereum 3, permit any node running appropriate client software to
connect andmine blocks. Permissioned (or consortium) blockchains
difer from a public blockchain since it can allow or deny speciic
addresses to view transaction information and participate in the
network. Access control mechanisms are an integral of the latter,
and our work manipulates those mechanisms (i.e., ACL) depending
on the perceived attacks.
2https://blockchain.info/
3https://www.ethereum.org/
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3 CASE STUDY: SMART HOME
3.1 Problem Statement
In a network of IoT devices, nodes are allowed to communicate
with other nodes providing they know the addresses of their peer
nodes. Since IoT devices often have vulnerabilities which can be
leveraged by attackers for malicious purposes, it is important that
nodes should not have the sole control of communication. By only
exposing the blockchain address of a recipient node (a function
of the private/public key of the node), nodes would communicate
through a permissioned blockchain, ensuring that transactions
stored in the mempool can later be analysed.
Let's consider the scenario of a household with several IoT de-
vices. These devices are expected to communicate with each other to
allow for a more integrated experience to the end user. For example,
a movement sensor placed at the front door (D) may communicate
with a kettle (K) that will start boiling when the owner enters the
house each day around 5pm. In typical implementations, these de-
vices may communicate using methods like HTTP, where D calls a
REST endpoint exposed by K, for example. In this model there is
no way for K to detect if D is acting out of character. An attacker
may have been able to compromise the sensor on the door and
maliciously begin boiling the kettle at arbitrary times. Considering
the variety of IoT devices is growing in scope, the implications are
potentially more serious.
In this example, we assume that each device has a certain be-
havioural proile, either set by an administrator or formed by the
network of IoT devices based on their behaviour over time. K should
identify D attempting to boil the kettle at unusual times or unusual
frequency as suspicious and potentially malicious. As well as being
intentionally compromised, some devices may begin to act out of
character due to a fault in their software. Being able to monitor and
analyse behaviour both increases security against attackers, and
ofers some protection against device malfunction. In this research,
the support for access control will be a very simple list, where nodes
have permissions for allowing or denying requests. In this context,
a blockchain, associated with the closed household network of IoT
devices, maintains a record of all transactions.
3.2 Experiment
We have implemented a permissioned blockchain using ℧ultiChain
because it allows to conigure permissions at multiple levels of the
multi chains, and to use federated mining (℧ining Diversity) that
can be more eicient.
A ℧ultiChain was deployed in a network of IoT devices in which
nodes had two distinct roles: controller and device. Controller nodes
do not actively submit and receive transactions but rather mon-
itor the network transactions, and administer the access control
list (ACL), while acting upon malicious behaviour. The controller
monitors newly mined blocks (through ℧ultiChain's blockNotify
event) in order to retrieve and analyse the block's transactions. If
a node is perceived to act maliciously, the controller transmits a
permission-update transaction by removing the ofending node
from the blockchain's ACL, preventing it from sending or receiving
further messages. In our experiment, we modelled malicious be-
haviour on the basis of transaction volume within a speciied time
window (one minute).
In terms of the ℧APE-K loop, the property of immutability in-
herent to a blockchain provides a distributed, safe way to execute
the ℧onitor stage of a ℧APE-K loop, whilst the decision reached
through consensus allows the Execute stage to be performed by the
collective eforts of a permissioned blockchain. In our experiment,
in the Analysis stage the number of transactions per node were
evaluated against a speciied threshold, if a violation was detected
the Plan would remove the node from the private network.
For our experiments, we have used 3 virtual machines run-
ning within a private network: Ubuntu 16.04, 1 CPU Core (Intel(R)
Xeon(R) 2.40GHz), and 20GB HDD. Nodes communicate exclusively
through the ℧ultiChain rather than traditional methods like HTTP
or TCP. Compared with a base level implementation using HTTP
with no authentication, our ℧ultiChain had a 750 fold decrease
in throughput, largely due to the way we fetch transaction data
through the use of the ℧ultiChain JSON API. These are preliminary
results, and signiicant improvements are expected if communica-
tion is done over TCP, for example.
One limitation of the proposed approach is that, permissionless
blockchains consensus algorithms require computational resources
that are impractical in the context of IoT. Another limitation specii-
cally concerning ℧ining Diversity in ℧ultiChain is that a malicious
node may mine a block once in a while without any punishment. A
promising solution for improving throughput is to use Byzantine
fault tolerant consensus algorithms, like Hyperledger Fabric 4.
4 CONCLUSIONS
By implementing a simple proof of concept, we have shown in
this paper that is feasible to incorporate self-adaptation into a
blockchain in order to protect a network of IoT devices from mali-
cious behaviour. We have demonstrated how properties of a permis-
sioned blockchain can implement the ℧onitor and Execute stages
of a ℧APE-K loop. There is no inherent reason why the Analysis
and Plan phases cannot be moved to functions of a blockchain.
Novel systems for the addition and removal of nodes have been
presented through the use of Smart Contracts , thus allowing the
full ℧APE-K loop to be executed through communal decisions and
logic.
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